GRADE NON-DISCLOSURE POLICIES: AN
ANALYSIS OF RESTRICTIONS ON M.B.A.
STUDENT SPEECH TO EMPLOYERS

Anthony Ciolli*
The past decade has seen a new trend emerge among the most elite
American business schools. In an effort to reduce competitiveness among
their respective student bodies, students at several elite business schools
have held referenda to prohibit any M.B.A. student from disclosing his or
her grades to employers. While these policies differ in scope, some
prohibit disclosure even if a failure to disclose one's grades would result in
one not obtaining a job offer. Students have usually ratified such ballot
measures by wide margins, and in the wake of such votes, some business
school administrators have gone so far as to make disclosing grades to
employers an honor code violation.
This Essay will explore the legality of such collective grade nondisclosure agreements, with a particular emphasis on First and Fourteenth
Amendment jurisprudence and relevant state statutes, such as California's
Leonard Law. Although courts have allowed public universities to place
limits on student speech when regulating speech enhances the educational
experience, restricting a student's ability to disclose information about him
or herself to prospective employers impairs the educational experience.
While private schools are generally not required to provide freedom of
speech protection to their student bodies, courts are unlikely to uphold
grade non-disclosure policies adopted by private universities located in
jurisdictions such as California where legislatures have prohibited private
schools from banning otherwise allowable speech, unless such policies are
tailored in a way that avoids official administration enforcement of the
policy.

*Chief Education Director, AutoAdmit.com, June 2004-March 2007. I would like to thank
Professors Gideon Parchomovsky and Al Brophy for helpful feedback and continued
inspiration and support.
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GRADE NON-DISCLOSURE POLICIES: AN OVERVIEW

Five elite American business schools recognize some form of grade
non-disclosure policy:
Harvard Business School,' University of
Pennsylvania's Wharton School,2 the Stanford Graduate School of
Business, 3 the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, 4 and the
Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley.5
Though most of these policies have several common traits, there are some
significant differences between them that are worth noting, particularly in
scope and enforcement.
A.

Adoption

Every business school grade non-disclosure policy has been initially
adopted through a student-initiated vote. The grade non-disclosure
movement originated in the 1990s, when jobs for graduate business school
students were plentiful and it was not uncommon for both those at the top
and bottom of an M.B.A. class to have as many as five or six job offers. 6
The Wharton School adopted the first non-disclosure policy in 1994 as a
result of a student initiated referendum and the policy remains in effect to
this day.7 Wharton M.B.A. students overwhelmingly voted in favor of the
policy, believing that grade non-disclosure would result in a more collegial
atmosphere and reduce competition among the student body.
1. Harvard Business School, MBA Recruiting:
Policies & Guidelines,
http://www.hbs.edu/mba/recruiting/policies.html#grade
(last visited Feb. 19, 2007)
[hereinafter HBS].
2. Wharton Graduate Association, Wharton MBA Student Policy on First and Second
Year Grade Disclosure Adopted by Referendum January 26, 1994, Updated February 22,
2006, http://wga.wharton.upenn.edu/gnd/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2007) [hereinafter WGA].
3. Stanford Graduate School of Business, Learning Methods: Grades-A Measure,
Not a Mandate. https://www.gsb.stanford.edu/mba/academics/leaming-methods.html (last
visited Mar. 31, 2007) [hereinafter SGSBI.
4. University of Chicago Graduate Business Council, Grade Non-Disclosure Policy,
http://student.chicagogsb.edu/group/gbc/gnd.htn (last visited Feb. 19, 2007) [hereinafter
CGSB].
5. Haas School of Business, Career Services: Student Grades Disclosure Policy,
http://www.haas.berkeley.edu/careercenter/gradedisc.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2007)
[hereinafter Haas].
6. Geoff Gloeckler, Campus Confidential: Four Top-Tier B-Schools Don't Disclose
Grades. Now that Policy Is Under Attack, Bus. WK., Sept. 12, 2005, available at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_37/b3950064_mz056.htm.
7. Jesse Rogers, MBA Changes May Intensify Competition: New Ranking Policy
Would Reward Greater Number of Students, THE DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, Sept. 16, 2005,
availableat
http://media.www.dailypennsylvanian.com/ news/2005/09/16/ (follow hyperlink of article
title) (last visited Feb. 19, 2007).
8. Id.
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Students at other business schools followed Wharton's lead by
initiating similar referenda within the next few years. In 1998, the
overwhelming majority of Harvard Business School's student body voted
to adopt the following policy:
In support of the academic mission of the MBA Program and as
voted by the student body on January 23, 1998, individual grades
received at HBS shall not be communicated to an HBS recruiter
before a job offer is extended. Likewise, HBS recruiters must
agree not to use a student's individual grades as a condition of
employment. The award of academic honors is the only
standardized measure of academic performance obtained at HBS
that can be disclosed during the recruiting process. 9
In 2000, students at the University of Chicago's Graduate School of
Business chose to implement a similar grade non-disclosure policy.'0 The
Stanford Graduate School of Business's student body also adopted similar
grade disclosure restrictions in 2001.1
U.C. Berkeley's Haas School
adopted the most recent policy, with its2 full-time M.B.A class of 2007
having voted for a non-disclosure policy.'
In recent years other business schools have considered implementing
grade non-disclosure policies.
The University of California at Los
Angeles's Anderson School of Business surveyed its student body about
grade non-disclosure in 2005, discovering that 50.4 percent of Anderson
M.B.A. students favored implementing grade non-disclosure. 3 Some
M.B.A students at the University of Michigan Business School have
encouraged the administration to institute a grade non-disclosure policy so
that M.B.A. students can focus on "being more collaborative rather than
more competitive with their peers."' 4 Not all business school students,
however, support restrictions on student speech to employers. Students at
Cornell University's Johnson School appear indifferent to the idea. 5 In
9. HBS, supra note 1 (emphasis omitted). Harvard Business School changed their
policy in 2005, stating that "beginning with students matriculating in the fall of 2006, HBS
will no longer prohibit students from disclosing, during the interview process, the individual
grades they earn in courses in the MBA program. The choice of whether or not to disclose
grades will be left entirely to each student." Id.
10. CGSB, supra note 4.
11. The Deans Respond to Class Vote on Norms and Grade Disclosure, STAN. Bus.
REP., Oct. 15, 2001 [hereinafter Deans Respond].

12. Haas, supranote 5.
13. Anderson School of Business, Results Summary, Aug. 23, 2005,
http://www.anderson.ucla.edu/zone/asa/docs/ASAAcademicSurveyResults.pdf (last visited
Feb. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Anderson].
14. Dave Griffus, QOTW: Sage Advice, MONROE ST. J., Apr. 19, 2004, available at
http://www.themsj.com/media/paper207/news/2004/04/19/Qotw/Qotw-Sage.Advice664986.shtml?page=2 (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
15. Nilanjan Banerjee, Grade Disclosure-Good or Bad?, CORNELL Bus., Nov. 5,
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fact, a few student bodies have voted down grade non-disclosure ballot
measures.
A 1998 referendum at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology's Sloan School failed to pass. 16 At Northwestern University's
Kellogg School of Business, a non-disclosure initiative did not pass in
2004, when 52 percent of M.B.A. students voted to maintain Kellogg's
current grade disclosure policy. 7 Although a 67 percent supermajority
vote was needed to implement grade non-disclosure, only 47 percent voted
to prohibit students from disclosing grades to employers. 8 A similar
referendum at Columbia Business School that required a 75 percent
supermajority to pass also was defeated after this threshold was not met.' 9
B.

Scope

Grade non-disclosure policies differ in the scope to which they limit
student disclosure of information to employers and other third parties.
1.

Employer Speech Restrictions

All grade non-disclosure policies allow students to disclose their
grades to other academic programs. 20 Thus, these policies are only
intended to limit the amount of information students disclose to potential
employers. However, different schools have placed different restrictions
on student/employer speech. One can classify these schools into two
categories: those that have adopted broad policies, and those who have
implemented narrow policies.
a. Broadpolicies
The Wharton School, the University of Chicago Graduate School of
Business, and the Stanford Graduate School of Business have implemented
very broad grade non-disclosure policies. These schools prohibit students

2004,
available
at
http://www.cornellbusiness.com/media/paper145/news/2004/11/05/Careers/Grade.Disclosur
e.Good.Or.Bad-799146.shtml?page=1 (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
16. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Senate Memo: The Referendum Process,
April 13, 1999, http://web.mit.edu/sloansenate/fu041399ref.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
17. KSA Website, 2004-2005 KSA Accomplishments:
Grade Non-Disclosure,
http://www.kellogg.northwestem.edu/student/ksa/ksasite/dynamik-site/Accomplishments-o
ld.htm#grade (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
18. Id.
19. Bill Dickey, GBA Debating Whether to Let Students Vote on Disclosure, BOTroM
LINE,
November
8,
2004,
at
1,
5,
available
at
http://wwwO.gsb.columbia.edu/students/organizations/retail/BLNov18_FINAL_1_22.pdf.
20. See Table 1 infra p. 717.
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from disclosing some grade information to all potential employers, which
not only include employers that participate in on-campus recruiting, but
also employers who do not formally recruit students through schoolsponsored functions. Thus, a Wharton M.B.A. student would violate
Wharton's non-disclosure policy if he or she included an official transcript
along with his or her resume as part of a self-initiated mass mailing of
employers who do not participate in on-campus recruiting.
b.

Narrowpolicies

Harvard Business School and U.C. Berkeley's Haas School of
Business adopted more narrowly tailored non-disclosure policies. These
narrow policies do not attempt to regulate grade disclosure outside of the
on-campus recruitment process. The Harvard referendum limited the
policy to "HBS recruiters," a term used to reference employers who
participate in school-sponsored recruitment events, such as career fairs.2'
stating that "[t]his policy is
The Haas policy is even more explicit, outright
22
recruiting.
on-campus
to
limited
officially
2.

Information Limits

The non-disclosure policies also significantly differ in what
information students cannot disclose to employers. While no policy
prohibits students from sharing standardized test scores or grades from
previously earned academic degrees, there is significant differentiation in
what information students can disclose about their current academic
performance. Non-disclosure policies can be sorted into two groups:
complete non-disclosure policies and limited non-disclosure policies.
a.

Complete non-disclosurepolicies

Only one school, the Stanford Graduate School of Business,
implemented a complete non-disclosure policy. The Stanford GSB policy
that began in 2001 prohibitted M.B.A. students from disclosing any
information about their absolute or relative performance at Stanford GSB.
The student-initiated policy restricted students from revealing "Dean's List
standing, GPA, percentile 23rank or specific class grades to potential
employers until graduation.,
21. HBS, supra note 1.
22. Haas, supra note 5.
23. Deans Respond, supra note 11. Since the Stanford GSB student body adopted this
policy, the business school's official statements regarding the policy indicate that students
may choose to disclose their grades: "The GSB has no policy on grade disclosure; your
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Limited non-disclosurepolicies

Most non-disclosure policies are limited non-disclosure policies. The
Wharton School, Harvard Business School, the Haas School, and the
University of Chicago Graduate School of Business have adopted policies
that prohibit students from disclosing most information about themselves,
but these policies allow students to disclose some aspects of their academic
performance.24 These schools do not allow students to disclose individual
grades or grade point averages; however, students are free to disclose
academic honors, such as Director's List status.25
3.

When Can Students Disclose Grades?

Schools also differ as to when these non-disclosure policies are no
longer binding on their student bodies. Limited non-disclosure policies can
be divided into three groups based on when students are no longer expected
to follow them.
a.

Second interview disclosure

The University of California at Berkeley's Haas School does not allow
students to disclose grades during the first stage of the recruiting process.26
Unlike other schools with non-disclosure policies, Haas relaxes its policy
after this stage: students are given the option of disclosing their grades to
employers if they are selected for second round, or callback, interviews.
Thus, employers are still able to consider the grades of Haas students prior
to making a permanent job offer.
b.

Employment offer disclosure

Harvard Business School, the Wharton School, and the University of
Chicago Graduate School of Business prohibit grade disclosure to
employers before a job offer is made.27 However, once a student accepts an

grades belong to you and it is your right to use them as you wish. Stanford's nondisclosure
norm among MBA students, however, has existed for nearly 40 years." SGSB, supra note
3.
24. CGSB supra note 4; Haas, supra note 5; HBS, supra note 1; WGA, supra note 2.
25. Nomination to the Director's List at Wharton signifies that one is in the top 10
percent of one's M.B.A. class. University of Pennsylvania Wharton School: Survey
Details,
BUSINESS
WEEK,
available
at
http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/98/top25/profile 166.
htm
26. Haas, supra note 5.
27. CGSB, supra note 4; HBS, supra note 1; WGA, supra note 2.
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offer of employment from an employer, the non-disclosure policies adopted
by these schools allow the student to disclose his or her grades to the
employer.
c.

Graduationdisclosure

In contrast, the Stanford Graduate School of Business student-initiated
policy prohibitted students from disclosing their grades to potential
employers even after an employment offer has been made. At this school,
individuals cannot disclose certain grades to employers until after
graduation.28
C.

Recognition and Enforcement

Finally, non-disclosure policies differ significantly in how they are
recognized by and enforced at their respective institutions. Schools can be
divided into three groups based on recognition and enforcement levels: (1)
those that provide official recognition and official enforcement, (2) those
that provide official recognition but not enforcement, and (3) those that
provide neither recognition nor enforcement.
1.

Official Recognition, Official Enforcement

Only one school-Harvard Business School-provided both official
recognition and enforcement of their respective grade non-disclosure
policies. At Harvard, the policy was considered an official school policy,
and admitted M.B.A. students were required by the school's administration
to agree to the terms of the grade non-disclosure policy prior to
matriculation.29 Students who do not abide by the policies were subject to
disciplinary action.3 °
2.

Official Recognition, Unofficial Enforcement

The Wharton School is the sole institution to take a middle ground
stance towards its non-disclosure policy.
Wharton administration
acknowledges the policy and disseminates information about the policy to
recruiters and other third parties.3 However, unlike Harvard Business
School, the Wharton administration does not play any role in actually
enforcing the policy. Rather than subjecting students to formal disciplinary
28.
29.
30.
31.

Deans Respond, supra note 11.
HBS, supra note 1.
Id.
WGA, supra note 2.
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action for disclosing grades to employers, the Wharton administration
delegates enforcement to students themselves through the Wharton
Graduate Association (WGA), the Wharton M.B.A. division of student
government.32 Thus, the penalty for not complying with Wharton's grade
non-disclosure policy is more akin to the penalty for violating an
established social norm, such as failing to tip in a fancy restaurant, rather
than the penalty for plagiarism or a comparable violation of school policies.
3.

Unofficial Recognition, Unofficial Enforcement

The remaining three schools-the Stanford Graduate School of
Business, the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, and the
Haas School-not only fail to officially enforce these policies, but
explicitly state that their administrations do not formally recognize these
policies. Chicago, while including the text of its policy on its website,
includes a disclaimer stating that the policy "is not a policy of the Graduate
School of Business or the University of Chicago."33 The Stanford Graduate
School of Business states: "The GSB has no policy on grade disclosure;
your grades belong to you and it is your right to use them as you wish.
Stanford's nondisclosure norm among MBA students, however, has existed
for nearly 40 years. 3 4 The Haas Career Services office takes an even
stronger approach to distancing itself from the non-disclosure policy; not
only does its webpage state that "a nondisclosure policy is not an official
policy of the Haas School of Business," but it goes so far as to all but
denounce the policy, informing recruiters that "[t]he Administration and
Faculty believe that grades are an important source of information for
employers about potential employees."35
The following table provides a concise summary as to how the
policies of all five institutions compare to each other in scope, recognition,
and enforcement.

32.
33.
34.
35.

Id.
CGSB, supranote 4.
SGSB, supra note 3.
Haas, supra note 5.
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TABLE 1: GRADE NON-DISCLOSURE POLICIES 36

Chicago
Cannot Reveal...
GPA
X
Some grades
X
Honors

Haas

Harvard

Stanford

Wharton

X
X

X
X

X
X
X

X
X

X

X

X
X

X
X

To...

OCI Employers
Other Employers

2 nd

X
X

Until...
Interview

Job Offer
Graduation

X
X

X

X
X

Recognized...

Officially

II.

X

Unofficially
Enforced...
Officially

X

Unofficially

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION: STUDENT SPEECH RIGHTS

To determine which, if any, of these non-disclosure policies are in
violation of the law, one must first examine the limitations courts and
legislatures have placed on a college's ability to restrict student speech.
This section will summarize the current state of the law, with the next
section applying the law to the context of business school grade nondisclosure policies.

36. CGSB, supra note 4; Haas, supra note 5; HBS, supra note 1; SGSB, supra note 3;
WGA, supra note 2.
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The Relationship between Colleges and Students

Prior to the 1970s, courts generally held that a "college's relationship
to its students was . . . parental in nature, 37 and thus both public and
private colleges could "exercise virtually unchecked authority over
students' lives. 38 Since colleges stand in loco parentis,they could "make
any rule or regulation for the government, or betterment of their pupils that
a parent could for the same purpose.,

39

This idea that a college could act in
loco parentis, as well as a general belief that attending even a public
college was a privilege,4" precluded students from asserting claims against
institutions based on their constitutional rights.4 '

The past forty years, however, have seen a transition from the in loco
43
42
parentis doctrine to a contract theory approach. Both federal and state
courts have increasingly found that the relationship between colleges and
universities and their students is contractual in nature.

Though some

scholars have argued that contract theory is a poor fit for the college and
student relationship, 44 courts have generally found that "[t]he elements of a
traditional contract are present in the implied contract between a college

and a student attending that college, and are readily discernible. ' 45'
Students, once they are admitted to a university and they decide to
37. William A. Kaplin, Law on the Campus 1960-1985: Years of Growth and
Challenge, 12 J.C. & U.L. 269, 272 (1985).
38. Id.
39. Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 379 (1913).
40. Kaplin, supra note 37.
41. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 262 (1934)
(The fact that they are able to pay their way in this University but not in any
other institution in California is without significance upon any constitutional or
other question here involved. California has not drafted or called them to attend
the University. They are seeking education offered by the state and at the same
time insisting that they be excluded from the prescribed course solely upon
grounds of their religious beliefs and conscientious objections to war ... and
military education.).
42. See, e.g., Slaughter v. Brigham Young Univ., 514 F.2d 622, 626 (10th Cir. 1975)
(opining that "some elements of the law of contracts are used and should be used in the
analysis of the relationship between plaintiff and the University"); Russell v. Salve Regina
Coll., 938 F.2d 315, 316 (1st Cir. 1991) (stating that "a student-college relationship is
essentially a contractual one.").
43. See, e.g., Carr v. St. John's Univ., 231 N.Y.S.2d 410, 413 n.1 (1962) ("When a
student is duly admitted by a private university, secular or religious, there is an implied
contract between the student and the university that, if he complies with the terms
prescribed by the university, he will obtain the degree which he sought.").
44. See, e.g., Victoria J. Dodd, The Non-ContractualNature of the Student- University
ContractualRelationship, 33 U. KAN. L. REv 701, 730 (1985) (noting that there is a "lack
of a true bargaining and promise orientation in the student-university context ....
Thus,
the relationship is "intrinsically non-contractual" in nature).
45. Johnson v. Lincoln Christian Coll., 501 N.E.2d 1380, 1384 n.1 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).

2007]

GRADE NON-DISCLOSURE POLICIES

matriculate, agree to abide by that university's rules and regulations, and
colleges and universities are expected to then abide by those rules as well.46
B.

Campus Speech Restrictions: The CurrentState of the Law

The shift from in loco parentis to contract theory allowed students to
47
challenge certain college practices in court, ranging from grade disputes
to the recognition of student organizations. 48 Although college restrictions
on student speech have been challenged, the legality of a speech restriction
often depends on whether the college is public or private.49
1.

Public Schools

Although public colleges are able to enter into enrollment contracts
with students, 50 there are greater limits as to what a public college can
require of its students than a private college. Public colleges, as
government entities, must comply with the provisions of the U.S.
constitution, state constitutions, and relevant federal and state legislation.
Most disputes regarding public college restrictions on student speech
have focused on whether the public college's regulations violate the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, particularly the First Amendment's Free
Speech and Press Clauses. In Healy v. James," the Court held that "state
colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the
First Amendment., 52 However, the Court has also held that "First
Amendment rights [should be] applied in light of the special characteristics
46. See, e.g., Vought v. Teachers Coll., Columbia Univ., 511 N.Y.S.2d 880, 881 nn.l-2
(N.Y. App. Div. 1987) ("When a student is admitted to a university, an implied contract
arises between the parties which states that if the student complies with the terms prescribed
by the university, he will obtain the degree he seeks."); Healy v. Larsson, 323 N.Y.S.2d 625,
627 n.3 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971) (holding that a student is entitled to receive a degree because
he "satisfactorily completed a course of study at [the] community college as prescribed to
him by authorized representatives of the college .... "); Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. v.
Babb, 646 S.W.2d 502, 506 nn.6-7 (Tex. App. 1982) ("We hold that a school's catalog
constitutes a written contract between the educational institution and the patron, where
entrance is had under its terms.... [Further, the student] had a right to rely on its terms.").
47. See, e.g., Harris v. Blake, 798 F.2d 419 (10th Cir. 1986) (involving a graduate
student claiming due process violations following an unfavorable letter of evaluation and
low grades).
48. See, e.g., Gay Student Servs. v. Tex. A&M Univ., 737 F.2d 1317 (5th Cir. 1984)
(upholding state's right to support university's refusal to recognize a homosexual student
group).
49. See discussion infra Part II.B. 1.
50. See Larsson, 323 N.Y.S.2d at 626 nn.1-2 (finding that "[tlhere is no reason why this
principle should not apply to a public university or community college.").
51. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
52. Id. at 180.
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of the school environment,"53 and that "[a] university's mission is
education, and decisions of this Court have never denied a university's
authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission
upon the use of its campus and facilities."54
Lower courts, however, have generally not found public college
speech regulations reasonable if alternatives exist that would not restrict
speech. For example, in Iota Xi Chapterof Sigma Chi Fraternityv. George
Mason University,55 the Fourth Circuit held that a public college could not
punish students for making racist or sexist remarks even though the college
"has a substantial interest in maintaining an educational environment free
of discrimination and racism, and in providing gender-neutral education,"
permissible means
because "a public university has many 5constitutionally
6
to protect female and minority students.
2.

Private Schools

Unlike public schools, the legal environment of private schools is less
straightforward.
While it is clear that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments apply to public schools due to the state action doctrine,57
private schools are in a more nebulous realm. Some private schools are
held to the same standard as public schools, while many others are able to
restrain student speech however they wish without violating any
constitutional provision or statute.
In the absence of legislation or regulations stating otherwise, First and
Fourteenth Amendment protections do not apply to private actors,
including private schools. While private schools often serve a public
function and receive significant amounts of public funding, courts have
generally treated private schools as private actors. The U.S. Supreme
Court first addressed the public function issue in 1819, where Justice Story,,
in his concurring opinion in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,"
stated that Dartmouth College remains a private entity even though its
charitable mission is a public one. 59

53. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
54. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 268 n.5 (1981) (citing Tinker).
55. 993 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1993).
56. Id. at 393. Contra, Paul Horwitz, Grutter's FirstAmendment, 46 B.C. L. REv. 461,
467 (2005) (arguing that dicta in Grutter v. Bollinger (539 U.S. 306 (2003)) "suggests that
universities may be entitled to greater latitude in formulating speech codes" despite earlier
case law holding otherwise).
57. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.
58. 17 U.S. 518 (1819).
59. Id. at 668-72 (Story, J., concurring) (arguing that an institution's public or
charitable mission does not make the institution public).
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Lower federal courts have generally deferred to Justice Story's
interpretation when faced with similar situations. 60 For example, the
Second Circuit, in Powe v. Miles,61 held that Alfred University, while
serving a public function and incorporated by the New York Legislature,
remained a private actor and its treatment of student protesters did not
constitute state action. 62 The Second Circuit affirmed this decision again
twenty years later in Albert v. Carovano,63 when the court found 64that there
was no state action when a private college disciplined its students.
The Supreme Court examined the public funding issue in RendellBaker v. Kohn,65 when it held that a private high school that consistently
received more than 90 percent of its yearly operating budget through public
funds and had none of its students pay tuition was still considered a private
entity, and its discharge of former teachers for exercising their First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights did not constitute a state action.66 Although
the Supreme Court has not explicitly held that a private university is not a
state actor even though it receives substantial public funds, such an
interpretation would not be inconsistent with the language in RendellBaker. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that lower courts have not treated
private universities as state actors.67
While the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution does not
traditionally extend to private universities because these schools are not
state actors, not all speech regulations by private universities are
constitutionally acceptable. Though interpretations of the U.S. Constitution
place limits on freedom of speech protection, states have the option of
providing even greater speech protections through their own individual
constitutions. California is arguably the most prominent state to have
included such expanded freedom of speech protection in its Constitution.68

60. See, e.g., Maiatico Constr. Co. v. United States, 79 F.2d 418, 421-22 (D.C. Cir.
1935) (quoting Dartmouth Coil., 17 U.S. at 668-72).
61. 407 F.2d 73 (2d Cir. 1968).
62. Id.
63. 851 F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1988).
64. Id. at 570.
65. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
66. Id. at 840-43.
67. See, e.g., Remy v. Howard Univ., 55 F.Supp.2d 27, 28 (D.D.C. 1999) (dismissing
First and Fifth Amendment claims against Howard University because the University is a
private actor); Greene v. Howard Univ., 271 F.Supp. 609, 612 (D.D.C. 1967) (holding that
government control of an institution, and not just receipt of public funds, is necessary in
order for the First Amendment to apply to the institution); Doe v. Univ. of Mich., 721
F.Supp. 852, 867 (E.D.Mich. 1989) ("Yale University [is] a private institution not subject to
the strictures of the First Amendment").
68. The California Constitution states that "Every person may freely speak, write and
publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A
law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 2(a).
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The California Constitution's free speech provisions even go so far as to
grant freedom of speech rights on private property. While some property
owners have claimed that the California Constitution's increased speech
protection results in a violation of their own First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected these claims and
affirmed the California Constitution's enhanced protections.69
A private university's jurisdiction, therefore, can play a pivotal role in
determining what restraints on student speech are constitutionally
permissible. Although private schools in states such as Massachusetts are
able to regulate or not regulate student speech as they see fit, private
schools in California may face judicial scrutiny when attempting to place
limits on student expression. For instance, in Corry v. Stanford7", a
California state court struck down Stanford University's speech code on the
basis that it violated Education Code § 94367, also known as the Leonard
Law. California's Leonard Law explicitly states that both Article 1, § 2 of
the California Constitution and the First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution apply to private universities located in the state of California.
It reads as follows:
(a) No private postsecondary educational institution shall make
or enforce any rule subjecting any student to disciplinary
sanctions solely on the basis of conduct that is speech or other
communication that, when engaged in outside the campus or
facility of a private postsecondary institution, is protected from
governmental restriction by the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution or Section 2 of Article 1 of the California
Constitution.
(b) Any student enrolled in a private postsecondary institution
that has made or enforced any rule in violation of subdivision (a)
may commence a civil action to obtain appropriate injunctive and
declaratory relief as determined by the court. Upon motion, a
court may award attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff in a civil
action pursuant to this section. 7'
C.

FederalLimits on Grade and EducationalRecord Disclosure

Unlike the laws governing student speech restrictions, virtually all
public and private colleges are subject to the same rules regarding the
disclosure of student grades and educational records.72
The Family
69. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (holding that private
shopping centers are held to the constraints of California's constitutional speech
protections).
70. No. 740309 (Cal. Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1995) (order granting preliminary injunction).
71. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 94367 (West 1992).
72. A very small number of states have passed laws that place additional regulations on
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Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 (FERPA)73 requires all
educational institutions that receive U.S. Department of Education funds or
who have their students receive such funds (including governmentprovided student loans) to comply with certain rules and regulations.7 4
FERPA requires these educational institutions to grant their students a right
of access to their education records 7" as well as the right to challenge the
content of those records.76 Furthermore, FERPA prohibits institutions from
disclosing "personally identifiable" information from a student's
educational records to institutional staff or others.77
However, there are several important limitations on FERPA. First,
multiple federal courts have prevented students from suing educational
institutions for not complying with FERPA's provisions.78 Since students
have no private cause of action against institutions based on FERPA, their
only recourse based on the statute is to file a complaint with the U.S.
Department of Education79 and hope that the department chooses to pursue
the issue on their behalf.
The second limitation, and perhaps the one most relevant to the
discussion of grade non-disclosure policies, is that FERPA, while placing
significant limits on a college's ability to disclose grades and other
educational records, 80 does not grant students an affirmative right to
disclose information from their educational records to third parties. 8' This
is perhaps because grade non-disclosure policies had not been
contemplated in 1974.82 Because neither FERPA nor any other piece of
educational record legislation or regulation grants this affirmative right,
students seeking to challenge the legality of grade non-disclosure policies
must base their claims on the First and Fourteenth Amendments.83

grade and educational record disclosure. Massachusetts, for example, has such a statute.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 15 1C, § 2(f) (2006). However, FERPA remains the "predominant
legal consideration in dealing with student records." WILLIAM A. KAPLIN & BARBARA A.
LEE, THE LAW OF HIGHER EDUCATION §4.16.1.

73. 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g).
74. Id.
75. 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.10-99.12 (2003).
76. Id. §§ 99.20-99.22 (2003).
77. Id. §§ 99.30-99.37 (2003).
78. See, e.g., Girardier v. Webster Coll., 563 F.2d 1267 (8th Cir. 1977); Smith v.
Duquesne Univ., 612 F.Supp. 72 (W.D. Pa. 1985).
79. 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.60-99.67 (2003).
80. Id. §§ 99.30-99.37 (2003).
81. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2003) (omitting any reference to such an affirmative right
to disclose).
82. The first grade non-disclosure policy was not implemented until 1994, twenty years
after FERPA was first enacted.
83. See discussion supra Part II.B.
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III. Do GRADE NON-DISCLOSURE POLICIES VIOLATE STUDENT SPEECH
RIGHTS?
Three factors will largely determine whether grade non-disclosure
policies violate student speech rights: school status and location, the
benefits of non-disclosure policies to the educational experience, and the
extent of the administration's involvement in enforcing the non-disclosure
policy.
A.

School Status and Location

Most schools that have implemented grade non-disclosure policies are
private. In fact, U.C. Berkeley's Haas School is the only public school that
has grade non-disclosure, though several other public business schools,
such as UCLA and the University of Michigan, are thinking about
instituting grade non-disclosure policies.8 4 Public schools, as government
entities, must comply with First and Fourteenth Amendment freedom of
speech protections, and thus the grade non-disclosure policy practiced by
Haas, as well as those under consideration by other public schools, is
subject to judicial scrutiny.
Most private schools with grade non-disclosure policies are located in
states without statutes similar to California's Leonard Law; in fact, of these
schools, only Stanford's Business School is subject to the same level of
judicial scrutiny as its public counterparts. Since Harvard, Wharton, and
Chicago are not subject to the Leonard Law or comparable legislation, their
grade non-disclosure policies are not in violation of the law.85
B.

Non-DisclosurePolicies and the "EducationalExperience"

After determining that a school's status or jurisdiction requires it to
comply with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, one must examine
whether the educational goals or benefits of a grade non-disclosure policy
justify the cost of restricting student speech to potential employers. Those
who support grade non-disclosure policies have traditionally argued that
these speech restrictions promote collegiality and otherwise enhance the
learning experience, as well as enhance student employment prospects.86
84. Anderson, supra note 13; Griffus, supra note 14.
85. Wharton is partially subject to the Leonard Law, since it has recently established a
campus dubbed "Wharton West" in San Francisco. However, since Wharton West only
offers an executive MBA program, rather than a traditional MBA program, the grade nondisclosure policy is moot, since executive MBA students already have jobs and attend
school
on
a
part-time
basis.
See
Wharton
West
FAQ,
http://www.wharton.upenn.edu/campus/wharton-west/faq.cfn (last visited Feb. 21, 2007).
86. See discussion infra Part III.B. 1-2.

2007]

GRADE NON-DISCLOSURE POLICIES

This sub-section will examine these arguments.
1.

Do Non-Disclosure Policies Enhance Classroom Interactions and
Promote Collegiality?

M.B.A. students at Wharton, the first business school to implement
grade non-disclosure, justified their decision to adopt a grade nondisclosure policy on the grounds that it would enhance the learning
environment at Wharton. The Wharton Graduate Association, in its 1994
grade non-disclosure referendum, stated that Wharton's curriculum "relies
heavily on experiential learning to develop students' leadership and
interpersonal skills," and that professors cannot effectively evaluate these
skills through traditional academic measures of performance, especially
when "[t]eams, rather than individuals, are held accountable for academic
performance. 8 7 The Wharton referendum further states that in the absence
of a grade non-disclosure policy, M.B.A. students may "avoid courses that
are challenging and/or removed from previous experience, thereby limiting
their education to ensure better grades." 88 Schools that followed Wharton's
lead used this same justification; for instance, the Stanford Graduate School
of Business's grade non-disclosure statement states that the policy was
adopted "support learning and collective respect at the GSB."'8 9
Many students believe that there is a relationship between grade nondisclosure and a school's academic environment. A 2005 poll of the
Wharton M.B.A. student body found that 82 percent of students felt a
switch to grade disclosure would harm the academic experience, with 85
percent believing grade disclosure would adversely impact Wharton's
collaborative environment and 70 percent of respondents stating that a
switch would have an impact on their course selections.9" Although
surveys conducted at other schools asked more general questions, 9' many
students stated that they perceived a relationship between culture,
collaboration, and grade non-disclosure. One Stanford M.B.A student
quoted in the Stanford Business Reporter stated, "The collaborative culture
at Stanford was one of the main reasons I came here and I feel Grade Non-

87. WGA, supra note 2.
88. Id.
89. Deans Respond, supranote 11.
90. Ari Chester, Why Wharton Students Oppose Grade Disclosure, WHARTON J., Nov.
at
available
2005,
7,

http://www.whartonjournal.com/media/paper201/news/2005/1 1/07/Perspectives/WhyWharton.Students.Oppose.Grade.Disclosure1047313.shtml?norewrite&sourcedomain=www.whartonjournal.com (last visited Feb. 21,
2007).
91. Survey Resultsfrom Grade Non-DisclosurePoll, STAN. Bus.

REP.,

Jan. 30, 2006.
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Disclosure is a significant influence on this collaborative culture." 92 A
Harvard M.B.A. student reacting to the Harvard Business School's recent
decision to revert to grade disclosure has predicted that "[w]ith the return
of grade disclosure, the incentive for some students to be cooperative may
not be there. 93
While a significant number of students believe grade non-disclosure
has a positive impact on the academic environment, empirical evidence
does not support this claim. Annual student surveys at Wharton have
revealed significant reductions in the amount of time students spend on
their coursework since grade non-disclosure was adopted; in fact, Wharton
M.B.A. Program Dean Anjani Jain reports that in the past four years alone
time spent on academics has decreased by 22 percent. 94 In addition to
devoting less time to their studies, Wharton M.B.A. students also perform
worse in their courses now than in the past.
For example, Jain has
observed that, in the years since grade non-disclosure, Wharton M.B.A.
student performance in cross-listed courses has steadily decreased-in fact,
Wharton undergraduate students now obtain, on average, higher grades
than Wharton M.B.A students in these cross-listed classes, with the gap
continuing to widen every year. 95
These effects are not limited to Wharton. Internal Stanford Graduate
School of Business and Harvard Business School studies reached similar
results. 96 In response, the deans of both schools sent memos to their
respective student bodies explaining the detrimental effect grade nondisclosure may have on academics, with Harvard's dean also announcing
that he would unilaterally end Harvard's non-disclosure policy effective the
97
following year.
2.

Do Non-Disclosure Policies Enhance Employment Prospects?

While many M.B.A. students have argued that non-disclosure policies
enhance their school's academic environment, other students believe that
non-disclosure enhances employment prospects or fixes deficiencies in the

92. Id.
93. Jeffrey Gangemi, Harvard: No More Grade Secrets, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 16, 2005,
available
at
http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/content/dec2005/bs20051216_4604.htm
(last
visited Feb. 21, 2007).
94. Gloeckler, supra note 6.
95. Id.
96. Memorandum from David Kreps, Dean, Stanford Graduate School of Business, to
the Students of Stanford Graduate School of Business (Sept. 2005) (on file with author);
Memorandum from Jay 0. Light, Acting Dean, Harvard Business School, to the Students of
Harvard Business School (Dec. 14, 2005) (on file with author).
97. Id.
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recruiting system. The 1994 Wharton referendum stated that "[g]rades can
be imperfect predictors of job performance" that "measure performance in
a setting that is often dissimilar to most work environments. 98 Although
many employers have responded to non-disclosure policies by using
GMAT scores as a screening mechanism, some students continue to believe
that "[g]rades have no place or relevance when considering the fit for
employee and employer." 99
However, anecdotes from business school recruiters indicate that,
whether students like it or not, grades do have a significant effect on the
recruitment process. Richard McNulty, Dartmouth's Tuck School of
Business head of career development and a former recruiter, has stated that
grade non-disclosure "puts good students at a disadvantage and may
discourage recruiters from coming to campus."' 00 Although recruiters have
begun to use "case interviews" and other methods of testing a job
applicant's quantitative skills, recruiters have only used these techniques
when grades are not available due to a non-disclosure policy, indicating
that employers may believe grades provide a better screening mechanism
than the more personalized evaluation methods that students seem to
prefer. 10t
To date, there has been no large scale empirical study of the
determinants of business school career placement that can confirm or refute
either argument. However, all evidence currently available suggests that
grade non-disclosure policies, at best, have no positive impact on
employment placement, while at worst may have a negative impact. A
simple linear regression on the top 30 American business schools, based on
data contained on Business Week's business school rankings website, °2
demonstrates that, after controlling for average work experience, median
GMAT, and school reputation, grade non-disclosure policies do not have a
significant impact on the percentage of M.B.A. student job-seekers who are
employed at graduation. In fact, of these variables, only school reputation
is a significant predictor of employment.

98. WGA, supra note 2.
99. Student Argues Against Grade Disclosure at HBS, WHARTON J., Jan. 23, 2006,
at
available
http://www.whartonjournal.com/media/paper20l/news/2006/0 1/23/Perspectives/Student.Ar
gues.Against.Grade.Disclosure.At.Hbs(last
1492710.shtml?norewrite20060316101 3&sourcedomain=www.whartonjoumal.com
visited Feb. 20, 2007).
100. Gloeckler, supra note 6.
101. Id.
WEEK,
Bus.
Insider,
102. MBA
http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/mbainsider/index.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).

U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW

[Vol. 9:3

TABLE 2: REGRESSION RESULTS (% JOB SEEKERS EMPLOYED AT
GRADUATION)

Model
1

R
.799(a)

Model
1 (Constant)

R Square
.638

Adjusted
R Square
.577

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
26.561
55.989

Std. Error of
the Estimate
6.572

Standardized
Coefficients
Beta

t
.474

Sig.
.640

Grade Non- Disclosure
Policy

.314

3.979

.011

.079

.938

Median GMAT

.104

.073

.269

1.434

.164

Average Work
Experience (in months)

-.214

.229

-. 119

-.932

.361

Business Week
-.547
-2.909
-.641
.220
Reputation/Satisfaction
Ranking
a. Dependent Variable: % Job Seekers Employed at Graduation
Another linear regression, using the same variables to predict the
percentage of M.B.A. student job-seekers who obtained jobs through
school-facilitated events such as on-campus recruiting, also provides
evidence that grade non-disclosure policies do not have an impact on
student employment outcomes. Once again, only one variable - average
work experience-is a significant predictor of job placement through
school-facilitated events.

.008
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TABLE

3: REGRESSION RESULTS (% EMPLOYED VIA SCHOOLFACILITATED EVENTS)

Model R
.586(a)
1

Model
I (Constant)
Grade Non- Disclosure

R Square
.343

Adjusted
R Square
.229

Std. Error of
the Estimate
8.256

Unstandardized
Coefficients
Std.
B
Error
39.841 70.811
4.104
5.472

Standardized
Coefficients

.137

.750

.461

T
.503

Beta

Sig.
.579

Policy
Median GMAT

-.027

.091

-.074

-.292

.773

Average Work
Experience (in months)

.687

.292

.407

2.353

.028

-.469

.278

-.425

-1.687

.105

Business Week
Reputation/Satisfaction
Ranking

a.

Dependent Variable: % Obtained Jobs Through School Facilitate
Activities
Unfortunately, these regressions may not necessarily paint a complete

picture of business school employment placement, since there may be some

error involved when using percentage employed as the dependent variable.
For instance, this figure does not take into account quality of employment
or other important factors. Although a more detailed study of business
school career placement is desirable, comprehensive studies of career
placement in other contexts has found a relationship between grades and
employment placement. For example, in the law school career placement
context, one recent study determined that students at law schools that use
Honors/Pass/Fail grading systems (where students in practice have little or
no means of differentiating themselves from other students through their
grades) experience worse career placement outcomes than students at
schools that use a traditional letter grade system.' °3 Thus, it is likely that a
more comprehensive study of business school career placement would
103. See generally Anthony Ciolli, The Legal Employment Market: Determinants of
Elite Firm Placement and How Law Schools Stack Up, 45 JURIMETRICS J. 413, 431-34

(2005) (observing that schools with "no grades" systems place their graduates in worse jobs
than students at schools with "traditional" systems).
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confirm the results of these regressions and show that grade non-disclosure
policies have no positive impact on employment placement outcomes.
3.

Should Schools Receive Deference Even If Non-Disclosure Does
Not Meet Its Intended Goals?

Some may argue that, even if grade non-disclosure does not result in
any benefits, schools should receive some degree of deference when
deciding educational matters. While greater deference to a school's
decisions might be appropriate in other contexts, this argument rings
hollow in the particular context of grade non-disclosure policies because
schools can try to achieve the same goals without restricting student
speech. Other schools that have tried to deemphasize the importance of
grades have chosen to adopt alternative grading systems in lieu of
restricting student speech. For instance, Yale Law School has adopted a
modified pass/fail grading system,"° while the New College of Florida has
eliminated grades altogether and provides its students with a narrative
evaluation of their course performance.I°5
C. Administrative Action
In addition to analyzing the costs and benefits of a grade nondisclosure policy, a court would have to determine the extent of the
administration's role, if any, in enforcing the policy. Because Stanford's
Graduate School of Business and the Haas School have explicitly stated
that they do not formally recognize or enforce these policies, 0 6 it is
unlikely that a California court would strike down either school's policy,
since students at neither school are formally disciplined for violating the
non-disclosure policies.
IV.

SHOULD LEGISLATURES RE-VISIT STUDENT SPEECH RIGHTS?

All schools that have implemented grade non-disclosure policies have
implemented them with legal constraints in mind, with schools subject to
the most judicial scrutiny having implemented liberal policies that are
unlikely to be struck down by a court. However, given the evidence that

104. Yale
Law
School,
Bulletin
of
Yale
University:
Grades,
http://www.yale.edu/buletin/htmllaw/grades.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2007).
105. Gordon E. Michalson, Jr., The Casefor NarrativeEvaluation: Promoting Learning
Without
Grades,
http://www.ncf.edu/PresidentsOffice/documents/TheCaseforNarrativeEvaluation.htm
(last
visited Feb. 20, 2007).
106. SGSB, supra note 3; Haas, supra note 5.
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suggests grade non-disclosure may not have its intended effects, Congress,
the California legislature, and other state legislative bodies might wish to
revise current legislation in order to provide greater protection for student
speech rights. This section will examine the policy implications of
maintaining the status quo, and discuss whether amending statutes such as
FERPA and the Leonard Law would result in a net benefit to society.
A.

Maximizing Student Freedoms

Those who oppose grade non-disclosure policies have generally
argued that non-disclosure, whether in a public or private school context, is
not consistent with the spirit of FERPA or federal and state constitutions.
Professor Ed George, who has lobbied for the abolition of Wharton's grade
non-disclosure policy, argues that grade non-disclosure "restricts the
freedom of anyone ... who would like to distinguish themselves by their
academic achievements."'' 0 7 According to George, a switch to a voluntary
grade disclosure policy "does not curtail the freedom of those who would
prefer to distinguish themselves" in ways other than their academic
performance, such as through extracurricular activities." 8
This argument alone is not compelling enough to justify additional
federal or state government intervention. While George correctly observes
that grade non-disclosure "coercively limit[s] an individual's freedom, 10°9
he fails to recognize that a government-mandated shift to a "voluntary"
grade disclosure system would have a similar coercive effect on students
who do not wish to disclose their grades. Even though students would
technically retain the right to refuse to provide prospective employers with
their grades, students would have very little choice in the matter in practice
because a refusal to provide an employer with grades upon request would
almost certainly cause a student to not receive a job offer."'
Previous legislation that was meant to maximize student rights has had
similar unexpected results. FERPA, for instance, granted students an

107. Ed George, Does GND Ultimately Serve the Best Interests of Wharton?, WHARTON
J., Nov. 7, 2005.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Though some students may wish that employers would not care about grades but
instead base hiring decisions on non-quantitative factors such as personality and
interviewing ability, many employers believe grades are "one of the primary criteria" used
in evaluating job applicants since they do have some predictive power in determining which
individuals "ha[ve] the bullets" for certain types of work. Heather S. Woodson, Evaluation
in Hiring, 65 UMKC L. REv. 931, 932 (1997). Furthermore, recruiters have observed that,
"it is very difficult in an interview, whether it is 20 minutes or a full day, to evaluate the
student's intellectual and analytical ability." Id.
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affirmative right to examine their educational records,"1 ' which includes,
among other things, admissions summary reports and letters of
recommendation." 2 Students began to request access to this information
under FERPA, and as a result colleges began to request that applicants
waive some of their FERPA rights when submitting their application for
admission." 3 Although waiving one's FERPA rights is voluntary, there
may be pressure to waive their rights out of a belief that doing so will make
the educational institution give greater weight to their letters of
recommendation and will improve their chances of receiving an admissions
offer."' Thus, if federal or state governments amended relevant legislation
to mandate voluntary grade disclosure systems, it would merely replace a
system where most students feel immense pressure to not disclose grades to
employers with a system where most students feel obligated to disclose
grades to employers.
B.

PotentialMacro-EconomicEffects

Since voluntary grade disclosure systems would not maximize student
freedom of speech rights, some may argue that it is inappropriate for the
government to amend FERPA or the Leonard Law because the current
system allows schools with grade non-disclosure policies and those without
such policies to co-exist. Theoretically, the free market is all that is
necessary to regulate this situation. For example, a prospective M.B.A.
student can weigh the potential pros and cons of grade non-disclosure
policies and, based on a cost-benefit analysis, decide whether to enroll in a
school that has grade non-disclosure or one that does not. Though
prospective students might not possess perfect information at the start of
the admissions process, schools can advertise the advantages of their
respective systems, and thus provide prospective students with enough
information to make an informed decision.
Initially, this argument seems compelling. After all, if grade nondisclosure impairs a particular school's educational experience or its ability
to place its graduates in desirable job positions, one would expect schools
to abandon grade non-disclosure over time on their own without
government intervention due to internal pressure from students or
111. 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.10-99.12 (1993).
112. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(A) (2002).
113. See, e.g., University of Oklahoma, Letter of Recommendation Form,
http://tulsagrad.ou.edu/odyn/odreferencel.pdf (providing an example of a letter of
recommendation form that gives the applicant a choice to waive his or her FERPA fights).
114. See,
e.g.,
Posting
of
Maf69
to
http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread id=265074&forum_id=2#3886853 (Sept. 23,
2005, 13:25 EST) (stating a belief that letters of recommendation "are more legit" if FERPA
rights are waived).
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faculty.' 15 This assumes, however, that grade non-disclosure policies at
some schools have not caused macroeconomic changes in the labor market
for M.B.A. students and graduates.
Though the earlier regression analysis showed that grade nondisclosure policies (or the lack thereof) have neither a positive nor negative
effect on employment placement at a given school," 6 the fact that some
schools have grade non-disclosure policies may have caused employment
rates to fall for M.B.A. students at all business schools. It is possibleperhaps even likely-that such a large number of prestigious business
schools adopting grade non-disclosure policies may have caused some
employers to alter their hiring practices. Since no grade non-disclosure
policy prohibits individuals from disclosing their grades to potential
employers after graduation,"' employers who wish to use grades as a
screening mechanism may refrain from hiring a significant number of
M.B.A. students for permanent positions while they are still enrolled in
school, instead preferring to hire greater numbers of very recent M.B.A.
graduates who can disclose their grades. If a large number of employers
change their recruitment practices in this way, the spillover effect may have
an adverse impact on schools that do not have grade non-disclosure
policies, because employers may hold off on making hiring decisions until
they can compare grades from all job applicants. If this is the case, and if
the drop in employment rates was close to evenly distributed, a simple
linear regression would not reveal the negative impact, but only show that
grade non-disclosure has no effect. While determining whether such
macroeconomic effects exist is beyond the scope of this Comment, the
potential for such ill effects on the labor market for M.B.A. students may
justify federal or state government intervention.
V.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The grade non-disclosure policies adopted by Harvard, Wharton,
Chicago, Stanford, and Berkeley, while possessing different characteristics,
would all likely withstand judicial scrutiny if challenged under current
higher education law, though for varying reasons. Administrators at other
business schools, however, should take note of these legal limitations when
constructing non-disclosure policies in the future.
Similarly,
administrators, legislators, and M.B.A. students may wish to consider the
potential negative effects grade non-disclosure may have on
115. In fact, this has already happened in the business school context. See, e.g., Light,
supra note 96 (stating that Harvard Business School will abandon its grade non-disclosure
policy beginning with the M.B.A. class entering in Fall 2006).
116. See supra Tables 2, 3.
117. See supra Table 1.
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microeconomic and macroeconomic employment placement when
determining to what extent student freedom of speech with regard to
potential employers may be infringed.

